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Abstract
When and why ethnic groups rebel remains a central puzzle in the civil war literature. In this
paper we examine how different types of inequalities affect both an ethnic group’s willingness
and opportunity to fight. We argue that political and economic inter-group inequalities motivate
ethnic groups to initiate a fight against the state, and that intra-group economic inequality lowers
their elite’s costs of providing the necessary material and/or purposive incentives to overcome
collective action problems inherent to rebel recruitment. We therefore predict that internally
unequal ethnic groups excluded from power and/or significantly richer or poorer relative to the
country’s average are most likely to engage in a civil war. To assess our claim empirically,
we develop a new global measure of economic inequality by combining high resolution satellite
images of light emissions, spatial population data, and geocoded ethnic settlement areas. After
validating our measure at the country- and group-level we include it in a standard statistical
model of civil war onset and find considerable support for our theoretical prediction: greater
economic inequality within an ethnic group significantly increases the risk of conflict, especially
if political or economic inequalities between groups provide a motive.
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1 Introduction
In order to understand why some ethnic groups launch a civil war, we need to answer the following
questions: Why are leaders of some groups willing to engage in a costly conflict against the state?
How are they able to overcome collective action problems and forge powerful rebel groups? And
why do citizens choose to leave their homes and join armed rebellion — an activity associated with
enormous risks to personal safety? While there is no shortage of answers to these questions in
the civil war literature, most research focuses either exclusively on opportunity mechanisms (i.e.,
logistical and power-related arguments) (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004)
or on factors associated primarily with willingness (e.g., political and economic grievances) (i.e,
Paige, 1975; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011). In
particular, the participation and rebel recruitment process — the key causal mechanism linking
explanatory factors to conflict initiation — is often ignored or formulated in vague terms. In the
early civil war literature, participation was the self-evident mechanism connecting various inde-
pendent variables, such as economic inequality, to conflict (e.g., Russett, 1964; Huntington, 1968;
Gurr, 1971; Paige, 1975). Since then, aside from few noteworthy exceptions (e.g., Wood, 2003;
Weinstein, 2007), little has changed. Among today’s most frequently cited formal models of civil
war onset (e.g., Fearon, 1993; Powell, 2006) mobilization processes remain exogenous and most
quantitative empirical research has failed to include variables directly linked to participation and
rebel recruitment or relied on proxies plagued by problems of equifinality.1
This paper examines why some ethnic groups rebel, focusing on both their leaders willingness
to do so and their ability to mobilize and create a powerful rebel organization. It does so by
distinguishing between different types of inequalities. While political and economic inequalities
between a country’s ethnic groups provide the necessary motives for ethnic elites and their followers,
the level of economic inequality within groups affects the elites’ mobilization capacity. Leaders
of ethnic groups with strong economic motives (wealthier or poorer than the average national
group) and political motives (excluded from political power) have greater incentives to form rebel
organizations and initiate conflict. The extent to which they are able to do so, however, depends
1Take GDP per capita, for example. While Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that low levels of economic development
is a proxy for state weakness and is therefore positively related to conflict, Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) explain the
same relationship in terms of an individual’s opportunity costs of joining armed rebellion.
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on their group’s level of economic inequality. The greater the level of economic inequality within a
group, the more concentrated the wealth within the hands of the elites and the greater the number
of poor and less educated citizens, which loosens the mobilization constraint and enables willing
leaders to mobilize a sufficient number of fighters to create a powerful rebel organization. Therefore,
we expect the positive association between intra-group economic inequality and conflict initiation
to be significantly larger if an ethnic group is excluded from power and/or is significantly better or
worse off economically than the average ethnic group in that country.
As an illustrative example consider the onset of the 2002 civil war in the Ivory Coast.2 Both
the Baoule´ and the alliance of northern ethnic groups, which formed the popular basis of Fe´lix
Houphoue¨t-Boigny’s rule, were on average equally wealthy and had both suffered from the decline
in production and the drop of world market price on cocoa – the Ivory Coast’s main export. In
the 1990s, virgin forest land became scarce and the production cost associated with ageing cocoa
trees increased (Woods, 2003, 649–650). In addition, members of both ethnic groups had limited
access to political power under the Gbagbo regime (2000-2010), a political opponent of Houphoue¨t-
Boigny. His agricultural policies tended to benefit his own ethnic group, the Be´te´, who until 1999
had been politically excluded. Using a definition of citizenship and identity that closely paralleled
his own ethnic and regional identity (Collett, 2006, 621–626), he established that indigenous land
could not be alienated from the community on a permanent basis, giving Be´te´ the right to reclaim
their land from members of other ethnic groups to which they had previously sold or given the
land in return for their labor (Woods, 2003, 651). In this situation existing theories of conflict
initiation provide little guidance on whether the Baoule´ or the northern alliance is more likely to
launch a rebellion. Both groups feel economically disadvantaged and have limited political power.
However, when taking into consideration the degree of economic inequality within each group a
clear prediction emerges. The Baoule´ are considerably more equal than the northern ethnic groups,
as most of them are farmers that own land suitable for cocoa production. In contrast, the northern
ethnic groups live in the Savannah and herd cattle, goats, or sheep or work as seasonal workers on
the cocoa plantations in the south. In addition, they face a large number of migrants from similar
ethnic background arriving from Burkina Faso in search of work and a better life. Hence, based
2For a detailed account of the Ivorian politicization of ethnicity and the economic circumstances at the basis of
this conflict see Woods (2003), Langer (2005), Collett (2006), and Boone (2007).
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on our argument, it is no surprise that the northern ethnic alliance and not the Baoule´ seized the
opportunity provided by the disorder after the failed coup in September 2002 to gain control of the
country.
In order to move beyond illustrative case studies and evaluate our predictions more system-
atically, we develop a spatial measurement approach of economic inequality. Following existing
economic research that uses night lights as a proxy of wealth (e.g., Henderson, Storeygard and
Weil, 2011; Hodler and Raschky, 2010), we combine geocoded data on ethnic settlement areas with
high resolution satellite imaginary of night lights and population estimates to create the first global
proxy of within-group inequality. We validate our measurement approach against existing measures
of economic inequality at the country-level and with geocoded survey data at the group-level for
Sub-Saharan Africa. We then add our proxy of intra-group economic inequality to an existing
statistical model of conflict initiation and find considerable support for our theoretical predictions.
The paper offers several important insights for conflict research. First, it highlights the impor-
tance of unpacking the concept of economic inequality and shows that different types of economic
inequality may affect conflict initiation in different ways. While inter-group inequality affects the
group elites’ motivation, intra-group inequality affects their opportunity to fight via their ability
to mobilize a sufficiently strong rebel army. Second, our findings suggest that these components of
economic inequality interact in such a way that is not well captured by measures of overall economic
inequality at the country-level, offering an explanation for why previous quantitative studies using
overall national inequality measures have failed to find significant correlations. Finally, this paper
provides a possible explanation for why price and trade shocks do not seem to have a consistent
impact on conflict initiation (e.g., Bazzi and Blattman, 2011). Our finding suggests that the ef-
fect of these economic shocks will, among other things, depend on the underlying distribution of
economic wealth, both between and within ethnic groups.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews and situates
the paper within the previous literature on inequality and conflict. We then link the different
types of inequalities theoretically to ethnic elites’ willingness and opportunity of conflict initiation.
The fourth section presents our measurement approach and evaluates our measure of economic
inequality against a variety of existing measures. Section five discusses the data and our empirical
research design, before we present and discuss our findings. Finally, we conclude and discuss some
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avenues for future research.
2 Inequality and Conflict
The connection between inequality and violence has long been at the center of conflict studies.
Grounded theoretically in the writings by Plato, Marx, de Tocqueville, and others, the proponents
of this relationship claim that unequal nations are more likely to experience political violence of
various forms. The key concept linking inequality to conflict is relative deprivation, which captures
the extent to which people’s expectations about what they should achieve exceeds their actual
levels of achievement. Relative deprivation leads to frustration and aggression, which motivate
individuals to participate in rebellion (Davies, 1962). The greater the level of relative deprivation,
the stronger the motivational base for political violence, and the greater the magnitude of violence
(Gurr, 1971, 9).
Decades of subsequent empirical research on the inequality-political conflict nexus have pro-
duced mixed results. While political and economic grievances have been repeatedly linked to con-
flict processes in the qualitative literature on civil wars (e.g., Gurr, 1971; Davies, 1997; Sambanis,
2005), the plethora of quantitative studies (over 43 according to Lichbach (1989)) found no robust
correlation between economic inequality and conflict (Midlarsky, 1988; Lichbach, 1989). In fact,
some of the most influential quantitative studies of civil war outright reject grievance-based expla-
nations, based on the lack of a statistically significant correlation between country-level measures
of individual wealth distributions and conflict (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeﬄer,
2004). Most recently, however, several quantitative studies have emerged, showing that the previ-
ous quantitative literature’s failure to detect a robust connection between inequality and conflict is
due to inappropriate conceptualization and measurement problems rather than the lack of a rela-
tionship. Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010), for example, argue that conflict processes between
ethnic groups should not be studied at the country- but at the group-level and show empirically
that politically relevant ethnic groups excluded from power are significantly more likely to initiate a
conflict. Moreover, Østby (2008), Stewart (2009), and Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011)
all provide robust quantitative evidence that horizontal economic inequality between ethnic groups,
as compared to the previously used vertical measure of inequality between individuals, significantly
5
increase the risk of conflict.
We expand this recent line of research that focuses on group-level factors to understand how
economic inequality affects an ethnic group’s likelihood of initiating a conflict. Following Ellingsen
(2010), we argue that both opportunity and motivation are necessary for an ethnic group to engage
in a civil war. While greater levels of inter-group inequality contribute to a group’s willingness,
higher intra-group inequality loosen the elites’ constraint to mobilize a sufficient number of fighters
and create a powerful rebel organization. Hence, all else equal, while both inter- and intra-group
inequality increase the likelihood of an ethnic group initiating a conflict, their combination seems
to matter, leading to a much more precise empirically testable prediction: those ethnic groups with
high levels of within-group inequality that are relatively poorer or richer than the average group or
excluded from political power are most likely to launch a rebellion.
While there is a rich literature on the motivational effects of inter-group inequality (e.g., Davies,
1962; Gurr, 1971; Davies, 1997; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Cederman, Weidmann and
Gleditsch, 2011), few studies look at the relationship between within-group economic inequality
and conflict. The sparse research that does exist provides two opposing views on the association
of intra-group inequality and conflict. The first focuses on identity formation as the basis for
group mobilization, arguing that mobilization requires a common identity and a collective unifying
structure among its members (Tilly, 1978, 84). A high level of economic inequality within an
ethnic group may create resentment, which undermines cohesiveness and the group’s ability to
take collective action, as the different social classes within the group identify more closely with
their counterparts in other ethnic groups rather than identifying with the member of their own
ethnicity but from a different social class (Stewart, 2000). Related to this, Sambanis and Milanovic
(2011) argue that intra-regional inequality will undermine mobilization, since any income gains
from victory will have to be distributed among the population. Thus, an increase in economic
inequality within an ethnic group should reduce the likelihood that this group rebels. The exact
opposite view has come out of economic theories of rebel mobilization and conflict. Esteban and
Ray (2011) propose a model of ethnic conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social
intolerance are responsible for various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. Mobilization
is considered to be costly and militants need to be compensated accordingly. Allowing for both
financial and human contributions to conflict they show how an increase in within-group inequality
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weakens the rebel’s mobilization constraint by reducing the opportunity costs and simultaneously
providing ethnic elites with greater monetary resources. Thus, rather than undermining group
cohesion and mobilization, these models suggest that the emergence of economic and cultural elites
are a crucial explanatory factor regarding conflict initiation. Similarly, Gates (2002) models the
costs of recruitment and allegiance for rebel groups as a function of the outside options of payoffs
for recruits. As intra-group inequality increases, outside payoffs decrease, which reduces the rebel’s
recruitment costs.
This paper follows the second approach, but takes a broader theoretical perspective with re-
gard to possible mechanisms through which intra-group inequality facilitates rebel mobilization.
We argue that within-group inequality does not only lower the opportunity costs for voluntary
participation and provides elites with greater wealth, but also lowers the costs associated with
indoctrination. Our empirical results indicate that there is a positive robust association between
intra-group inequality and conflict initiation, providing empirical support for the second view.
Empirical research on the relationship between within-group inequality and conflict is equally
sparse. In a recent working paper, Huber and Mayoral (2012) look at the impact of different forms
of economic inequality on conflict. Using over 200 individual-level surveys from 89 countries they
decompose overall economic inequality into between-group inequality, within-group inequality, and
overlap at the country-level (see Pyatt, 1976, on the decomposition of the Gini index). Consistent
with grievance-based arguments, they find a positive relationship between inter-group inequality
and conflict, but this finding rarely surpasses conventional levels of statistical significance. In
line with the second theoretical view above, they find a strong, robust positive association between
within-group inequality and civil war. Although their finding with regard to within-group inequality
is qualitatively similar to ours, our empirical approach differs in two important aspects. First, rather
than country-year, our level of analysis is a group-year, which we believe is the most appropriate to
study the impact of within-group inequality on conflict initiation and follows conceptual innovations
of previous research (e.g., Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). Second, by using a country-year as
their unit of observation, Huber and Mayoral (2012) are forced to create an aggregate measure of
within-group inequality across all ethnic groups of a country, risking aggregation bias (Signorino and
Xiang, 2011). By performing a group-level analysis we are able to avoid this risk, enter group-level
economic inequality directly into the statistical model, and thereby ensure a tighter connection
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between theory and empirics. Finally, our empirical analysis suggests that the effect of within-
group inequality on conflict initiation is conditional on the group’s political and economic status
relative to other groups in a country. In their analysis, Huber and Mayoral (2012) only consider
unconditional effects of the various Gini components, missing relevant interaction effects among
the different types of economic inequality.
More closely related to our empirical research design are Østby, Nord˚as and Rød (2009). They
study the impact of socioeconomic inequalities between and within subnational regions in 22 Sub-
Saharan African countries. By combining geocoded responses from the Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) of the US State Agency of International Development (USAID) with geographical
data on the location of conflict zones between 1986-2004, they find that conflict onset is more
likely in regions with strong relative deprivation and strong intra-regional inequalities. While we
agree with them that country-year is not the right unit of analysis, some aspects of their empirical
approach remain problematic. First, they proxy ethnicity by region, which is far from ideal, as
subnational regions are generally bad proxies for the ethnic group’s primary settlement area. By
using geocoded ethnic settlement areas our research design avoids this assumption. Second, they
assess whether a correlation exists between the level of inequality among survey respondents in a
subnational region and the risk of conflict in that region. We do not limit our research design in
that way. Our dichotomous dependent variable takes the value one if a rebel group is involved in
a conflict against the state on behalf of a certain ethnicity, independent from the location of both
the ethnic group’s settlement region and the conflict zone. Finally, they ignore interactions among
the different types of economic inequality, which we explicitly consider and find empirical evidence
in support of.
3 Inequalities, Motivation, Mobilization, and Conflict Initiation
This section describes the mechanisms linking inter- and intra-group inequalities to an ethnic
group’s risk of conflict initiation. We argue that both inter- and intra-group inequality are nec-
essary for an ethnic group to rebel. Political or economic inequality between groups provide the
necessary motivation for a group to consider initiating a conflict. Economic inequality within the
underprivileged group determines the elites’ ability to mobilize a sufficiently large number of fight-
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ers in order to win the conflict. We therefore predict a conditional positive relationship between
intra-group economic inequality and conflict initiation by an ethnic group: if and only if an ethnic
group is excluded from power and/or significantly better or worse off economically relative to other
groups do we expect a positive association between an ethnic group’s level of economic inequality
and the likelihood of conflict initiation.3 Below we first describe how inter-group inequalities affect
a group’s willingness to rebel and thereafter how intra-group inequality affects the elite’s ability to
create a sufficiently strong rebel group.
3.1 Inter-group Inequality and Motivation
As indicated in the literature review, the main way in which inequality has been linked to conflict
initiation has been through relative deprivation and grievances (e.g., Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1971;
Davies, 1997) at both the individual and group-level (e.g., Stewart, 2009; Cederman, Weidmann
and Gleditsch, 2011). Following this line of research, we argue that objective political and economic
asymmetries between ethnic groups can be transformed into grievances through a process of group
comparison driven by collective emotions, which provides the motivation to rebel.
Based on an extensive experimentally supported literature in social psychology, Cederman, Wei-
dmann and Gleditsch (2011) provide a convincing mechanism through which inter-group inequalities
are transformed into grievances. They argue that in the presence of salient group identities, mem-
bers of the involved groups are prone to make social comparisons that hinge on the distinction
between in-group and out-group categories, thereby linking inter-group asymmetries cognitively to
their social identity. Any perceived violations of norms of justice and equality will then typically
arouse feelings of anger and resentment among group members, which provides the necessary mo-
tivation to fight over scarce resources, such as economic wealth and political power (Cederman,
Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011, 481).
In order to see how different horizontal inequalities lead to conflict motivations, consider a polity
with two or more economically unequal ethnic groups. Poorer groups, especially those residing in
3Strictly speaking, the argument presented here is not causal. That is, we do not claim that changes in economic
inter- or intra-group inequalities cause an ethnic group to fight, as economic inequality is highly time invariant.
What we do argue, however, is that the presence of inequalities significantly affects the overall risk of an ethnic
group launching a rebellion. As the vast majority of arguments in the conflict literature, our claim is probabilistic:
disadvantaged ethnic groups that are economically more unequal are more likely to launch a rebellion then their more
equal peers. With regard to the actual conflict triggers we follow Gartzke (1999), who argues convincingly that the
causes of conflict are in the error term.
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backward peripheral regions, often desire to break away from the core of their countries, because
they perceive themselves to be systematically disadvantaged compared to wealthier groups in terms
of economic development and the distribution of public goods. Although the costs of independence
might be very high, these groups are often convinced that independence would significantly im-
prove their relative economic standing (Horowitz, 1981). Similarly, the groups in comparatively
wealthier parts of the country may also feel disadvantaged, especially if they believe that state-level
redistribution denies them the fruits of their land. Those groups seek secession in order to avoid
having to subsidize poorer groups (Horowitz, 1985, 249-250).
In addition to economic inequality, political inequality also provides ethnic groups with reasons
to initiate conflict. Political exclusion contributes directly to a groups willingness to rebel. Since
conflict is a costly action with an uncertain outcome, ethnic groups generally generally prefer to
change policy from within the political process. Whether it is possible and to what extent they
will succeed, depends on the the group’s access to political power. Obviously, if the group controls
power, it is free to implement its preferred policies. If the group is part of a ruling coalition, it will
have to bargain, which they may prefer to conflict, depending on their bargaining position. But, if
the group is excluded from power, the elites often have no other option than to rebel in order for
the state to consider their political demands (Lacina, 2011).
These arguments suggest that ethnic groups excluded from power and/or significantly better
or worse off economically relative to other groups are more willing to engage in a costly conflict.
Willingness to fight, however, is not enough. In order for a group to engage in conflict, it must
form a sufficiently strong rebel group that is able to succeed on the battle field. How intra-group
inequality affects this effort is subject of the next subsection.
3.2 Intra-group Inequality and Rebel Mobilization
Rebel mobilization is generally discussed within the collective action framework (Lichbach, 1998).4
This theoretical framework treats conflict victory as a public good, which provides individuals
with strong incentives to freeride (i.e., abstain from participation), since anyone can partake in the
4An alternative view is that rebel mobilization is not so much a collective action problem as in Olson (1965), but
a coordination problem as in Schelling (1980). Although important, we believe that this subtle theoretical difference
does not affect our following discussion.
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spoils of victory, regardless of whether they fought with the rebels or not.5 The solution to the
freerider problem within the rational choice framework is selective incentives, which refers to gains
that occur exclusively to those individuals taking part in the rebellion. Conceptually, the literature
distinguishes between three types of selective incentives: material, social, and purposive. Since
we focus on ethnic conflict and in particular politically relevant ethnic groups6, we ignore social
incentives as they are present within all groups and therefore cannot explain the difference in the
probability of conflict initiation between them.
Material Incentives
Of the different selective incentives, material incentives have received the most attention. Several
economic models have been proposed, treating participation in a rebel organization as one employ-
ment option in the labor market. In these opportunity cost models rebel recruitment is therefore
in competition with other employment options. Gates (2002), for example, sets the cost per fighter
in direct relationship to expected wages on the regular labor market and Grossman (1991) stresses
the private returns to insurgents from fighting, such as booty taken in a successful insurrection.
Hence, as intra-group inequality increases, the number of individuals that are unemployed and/or
work in low income jobs increases, lowering their opportunity costs and thereby increasing their
likelihood of joining the rebels.
In a recent model, Esteban and Ray (2011) study rebel mobilization in an ethnic group with
income heterogeneity, offering a more nuanced account on how increasing income inequality within
an ethnic group contributes to conflict. Allowing for both capital and labor contributions, they show
that rich individuals will opt to pay rather than serve, since their income from regular labor exceeds
the offered compensation rate for fighting, which rebel leaders set to maximize their probability of
victory. Poor citizens, however, will choose to fight rather than pay, as their labor market income is
5There are exceptions to the view that participation in rebel groups is subject to the freerider problem. Kalyvas and
Kocher (2007), for example, argue that a crucial flaw of applying the collective action framework to rebel mobilization
is that it assumes non-participation to be costless. But because civilians are often victimized in conflicts, joining
the rebels may be one way to minimize potential costs of being harmed. We do not discuss this view explicitly, but
believe that a positive relationship between intra-group inequality and rebel mobilization exists here as well. Since
the livelihood of poor citizens is at greater risk during war, a high level of intra-group inequality increases the number
of potential recruits, which reduces mobilization costs.
6Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010, 99) consider an ethnic group to be politically relevant “if at least one
political organization claims to represent it in national politics or if its members are subjected to state-led political
discrimination”. This definition is similar to the one proposed by Posner (2004).
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smaller. In contrast to the opportunity cost models, where intra-group inequality merely affects the
opportunity costs of joining the rebels, their argument highlights both sides of rising within-group
inequality: as intra-group inequality increases the opportunity costs of regular group members
decreases, while at the same time the elites’ available income increases. Thus, as within-group
inequality increases elites can not only mobilize more rebels at a given compensation rate, but also
create larger rebel movements with the same proportion of income.
Several studies on the recruitment of Hutu rebels during Burundi’s civil war 1993-2005 provide
strong empirical evidence in support of this causal mechanism. In a pilot survey of 350 ordinary
civilian and “rank-and-file” former civil war combatants, Mvukiyehe, Samii and Taylor (2006) found
that the vast majority (75%) of combatants participated freely, either seeking contact to the rebels
themselves or being recruited in the village. The vast majority of them also expected some form
of monetary benefit from participation, either in cash or kind. An empirically more sophisticated
account of the opportunity cost mechanism in the rebel recruitment process is provided by Nillesen
and Verwimp (2010). Instrumenting income short falls by insufficient rain, they provide strong
empirical evidence that villages with above mean incidents of insufficient rain were significantly
more likely to have experienced recruitment activities than others. They find similar results using
recall information on recruitment in a 13-year panel data set. Moreover, in a related paper Verwimp
and Bundervoet (2009) find that joining an armed rebel group was a lucrative decision: households
of which at least one member joined an armed group experienced a 41% higher growth in welfare
in the final years of the war (1999-2007).
So far we have focused on positive material incentives. Yet, as several studies — in particular
with regard to child soldiers — point out, participation in rebellion might be coerced, that is non-
voluntary and thus the result of negative incentives (e.g., Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; Andvig
and Gates, 2009; Beber and Blattman, 2010). Recruiting individuals by force is not cheap. Aside
from the costs of recruitment and retention, mobilization by force creates a particular third set of
costs associated with shirking. Since those recruits have not voluntarily joined the rebels, their
willingness to fight is probably low, which limits the group’s battle field performance. Moreover,
forcing citizens to join them at gun point or abducting children carries high reputation costs with
civil society. For all these reasons mobilization by force is likely to be rare, especially at the
initial stage of conflict, and more likely to be used by resource-poor rebel groups (Eck, 2008).
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In order to minimize the costs associated with coercive recruitment, rebels tend to employ this
mobilization strategy at night in rural areas or slums outside of urban centers, where the state
is weak or absent. Their ideal target is young, male, and poor, since they yield decent fighters
and are relatively easy to control and manipulate (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; Beber and
Blattman, 2010). Poor citizens are less able to protect themselves or their loved ones from threats
and abduction, they have less to gain from trying to escape, and they are often less educated and
therefore easier to persuade and manipulate. Although we do not think that negative material
incentives play a major role in the initial stage of rebel mobilization, we believe that an increase
in within-group inequality weakens the constrains rebels face in recruitment by force. As within-
group economic inequality increases, the proportion of poor increases, which expands the rebel’s
reservoir of potential recruits. A larger candidate pool makes recruitment easier, reducing rebel
mobilization costs. Macours (2010) provides some evidence in support of the positive link between
within-group inequality and violent recruitment. By combining newspaper accounts of abductions
with survey-based measures of district-level economic inequality, she finds that Maoist insurgents
in the Nepalese civil war appear to have targeted the districts with the fastest recent growth in
income inequality for violent recruitment during the later stages of the conflict. Thus, as with
positive material incentives, we expect a positive association between within-group inequality and
rebel mobilization through the use of force, although possibly to a smaller degree.
Purposive Incentives
Within the collective action framework, scholars have also discussed so-called purposive incentives,
which are usually conceptualized as internalized norms and values in which the person’s self-esteem
depends on doing the right thing (Oliver, 1993).7 To date, this type of incentives has received
relatively little attention in the conflict literature. Prominent exceptions are Scott (1976) and
Wood (2003), who argue that moral outrage led people to rebel against relative deprivation during
economic modernization in South Asia and government abuses in El Salvador, respectively. In their
view, emotional and moral motives were essential to the emergence and consolidation of collective
7In a rational choice framework such an incentive can be thought of as a “good” of inherent value that individuals
consume by performing some action, such as fighting. Such an approach is closely related to a branch of the voting
literature that suggests the collective action problem inherent in electoral participation of established democracies is
overcome by the value some individuals place on the act of voting itself (e.g., Dhillon and Peralta, 2002; Feddersen,
2004).
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action. Peasants joined the rebellion not for material or social benefits, but “because they took
pride, indeed pleasure, in the successful assertion of their interests and identity” (Wood, 2003, 18).8
These emotional and moral motives to join a rebellion may pre-exist and increase as higher
levels of intra-group inequality strengthens existing grievances, but can also be created and fostered
by ethnic elites. Wood (2003), for example, points out that many of the peasants fighting in the
rebellion had previously participated in a social movement calling for economic reform and political
inclusion, through which they had become convinced that social justice was God’s will and that
acting righteously was to participate in the rebellion. In a different study, Eck (2012) argues that one
of the key strategies used by the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) was indoctrination.
According to her research the Maoists spent up to a year prior to the conflict sending so-called
political-cultural teams into villages to educate the masses on their aims and the necessity of using
armed force to achieve political change. This campaign had a powerful effect on rural villagers,
who were not accustomed to being addressed with respect by individuals in positions of power. By
addressing the villagers, discussing their problems, showing how the CPN-M’s agenda may support
their goals, and requesting their assistance, the Maoist’s encouraged the villagers to be active
political agents, a radical departure from the villagers’ previous experiences of marginalization.
Moreover, the Maoists’ ideology was especially appealing to rural individuals since it matched well
with their own local agendas and grievances, providing them with the emotional and moral motives
to join the rebellion.
As in the case of material incentives, an increase in intra-group economic inequality is asso-
ciated with a decrease in the elite’s mobilization efforts via purposive incentives. Providing the
emotional and moral motives for an individual to fight on behalf of a rebel group, requires an
extensive propaganda and educational effort on behalf of the ethnic elites. Whether indoctrination
and propaganda work and how much effort it takes to create and foster such motives in support
of the rebel movement, depends on the amenability and moldability of the recipients. Research
in political communication and public opinion has shown that beliefs of less knowledgable and
less informed individuals are more susceptible to rhetoric, propaganda, and indoctrination (e.g.,
McGuire, 1969; MacKuen, 1984; Geddes and Zaller, 1989; Iyengar and Simon, 2000). Those indi-
viduals are on average less well educated and are economically worse off then their better informed
8She refers to this pride in the assertion of their interests and identity as ‘pleasure of agency’.
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peers. Since economic inequality and educational inequality are positively correlated (e.g., Castello´
and Dome´nech, 2002), greater intra-group inequality and higher educational inequality, raises the
number of people with few economic opportunities and little formal education. This increases the
effectiveness of a given level of indoctrination, which in turn lowers the elite’s mobilization efforts.
Hypotheses
Combining our arguments on the impact of economic and political inter-group inequalities on the
groups willingness and the effect of economic intra-group inequality on the elite’s mobilization po-
tential yields the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: All else equal, we expect both inter-group political and economic inequality and
intra-group economic inequality to increase the likelihood of an ethnic group’s involvement in con-
flict.
Hypothesis 2: We expect the relationship between an ethnic group’s level of economic inequal-
ity and the likelihood of conflict to be particularly strong for those groups that are excluded from
power and/or significantly better or worse off economically relative to other groups.
4 Measuring Within-Group Economic Inequality
Our analysis requires estimates of intra-group inequality at the level of ethnic groups, which are
difficult to obtain. In this section, we introduce a new way to measure intra-group inequality using
nightlight emissions. We first describe the data sources and the computation of the new measure,
and then present our attempts to validate it.
4.1 Using Nightlight Emissions to Measure Inequality
Most indicators of intra-group inequality such as the frequently-used Gini coefficient rely on survey
data. Survey-based inequality estimation is typically applied at the national level, where income
(or consumption) scores of a national sample of respondents are aggregated to obtain an estimate
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of within-country inequality. While this approach is not without problems (for example, surveys
measure income differently, which impedes cross-national comparisons), the main requirement, a
large enough sample of respondents that is representative at the national level, applies in most
cases. This is different when we move the level of analysis down to the group. Few surveys start
with a country’s list of groups, and then create representative samples for each of them. If surveys
include ethnic categories, they do so by relying on a respondent’s self-reported membership in a
group. Not only does this procedure fail to ensure representativeness at the group level (rather,
we have to assume it), it also makes it difficult to aggregate estimates at the group level since
self-reported categories may differ even if individuals are from the same group.
For these reasons, we resort to a different way of obtaining intra-group inequality estimates,
but use survey data to validate our new measure (see below). Similar to Cederman, Weidmann and
Gleditsch (2011), we use a spatial procedure to measure variation in wealth among the members
of a group. The general idea of this procedure is to combine maps of economic activity with
those about the settlement regions of ethnic groups. By finding out if group regions coincide with
locations of high or low economic activity, Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) are able to
compute wealth estimates at the group level, which are then used to determine the group’s relative
economic status in the country. While our procedure largely follows this approach and relies on
similar types of geographic data, the fact that we are examining within-group rather than between-
group variation requires us to adapt the earlier procedure. The economic maps used in Cederman,
Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) are based on the G-Econ dataset (Nordhaus, 2006). G-Econ maps
economic activity at the level of grid cells of size 1◦ by 1◦, which corresponds to about 110 km by
110 km at the equator. G-Econ picks up variation between these cells, but obviously not within.
With many group regions being covered by only one or a few G-Econ cells, we would not be able
to capture within-group variation at a sufficiently detailed level.
The requirement of fine-grained economic data leads us to abandon G-Econ in favor of another
type of data with high resolution, but a less perfect match to the concept we want to measure:
nightlight emissions. The amount of light radiating out from a particular location on earth can
be measured by satellites with extremely high spatial precision. We use data from the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), which are available at a 30 arc-minute resolution (ap-
prox. 1 km at the equator). The US National Geophysical Data Center (NOAA) archives and
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cleans the data, and makes them available for download. In particular, the data have cloud covers
and unsteady sources of light (such as fires) removed, and only contain stable emissions.9 We use
the first available year (1992) for our computation. For data on ethnic settlement regions, we use
the GeoEPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011), which is compatible with the group list from
the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). In short, our procedure
for calculating intra-group inequality works as follows:
1. Divide up the geographic space into small cells of equal size (1/12 of a degree, about 10 km).
2. For each raster cell, compute (i) the total nightlight emissions from the DMSP-OLS data,
and (ii) the total population using the Landscan high-resolution dataset (Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, 2008).10
3. For each raster cell, compute the cell wealth as nightlights per capita.
4. After ordering all cells in a given group’s settlement region by per capita wealth, compute
the Gini coefficient.
Based on this procedure, we end up with inequality measures at the group level, ranging from
0.05 (very little inequality) to 1 (perfect inequality). In the next section, we discuss potential
problems associated with the measure, and present our attempts to validate it.
4.2 Validating the New Measure
Since our approach is a new attempt to measure economic inequality, we need to take a closer look at
its validity. There are two potential sources of error. First, nightlights may not be a good proxy for
economic wealth at the individual level. This may be (i) because nightlights could be a poor proxy
for economic wealth in general, or (ii) because the satellite image is unable to distinguish between
individuals of different incomes at a given location. The first concern is somehow alleviated by the
finding that light emissions correlate highly with economic performance. Henderson, Storeygard
and Weil (2011) use nightlight emissions and their changes over time to measure national-level
9See http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html for more information and visualization of
the data.
10Alternative population raster datasets exist. In order to make sure that our results do not depend on the Landscan
data, we have also tested the Afripop dataset (Tatem et al., 2007) and achieved virtually identical results.
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economic growth and find that they serve the purpose relatively well, in particular in regions where
other, more accurate measurements are difficult to get (see also Chen and Nordhaus, 2011). Still,
at the subnational level, nightlight emissions could be driven by state-sponsored development and
electrification (Min, 2010), which would be problematic for our approach that relies on subnational
variation on light emissions.11 The second concern results from the fact that our inequality indicator
captures variation in light emissions between larger cells, rather than variation between individuals.
By assigning everybody living in a particular cell to have that cell’s wealth level, we may be
unable to capture considerable variation in wealth that exists, for example, among people living
an urban environment. We try to gauge the magnitude of this error by computing country-level
inequality estimates based on nightlights, and validating them against conventional, survey-based
indicators. These fairly reliable, frequently-used country-level estimates are able to tell us whether
the nightlights-based indicator is able to pick up variation in inequality at the country level.
The second source of error is related to our procedure of approximating group settlement regions
with polygons. Using the GeoEPR dataset as described above, everybody living within one of these
polygons is assigned to a particular group. Again, urban areas with a high degree of ethnic mixing
would be particularly prone to errors, since our data is unable to capture variation in ethnic groups
at a particular location. In a second validation exercise, we assess the extent to which GeoEPR
group regions correspond with individual-level data on ethnicity obtained from surveys. If both of
these tests are successful, we should be optimistic about our indicator: If nightlights can pick up
inequality for large areas such as countries (first validation), and at the same time the GeoEPR
group regions are accurately measured (second validation), we should also be able to use the
nightlights measure for group regions. Finally, we conduct a comparison at the group level between
survey-based Gini coefficients and those obtained from nightlights. Due to the inherent difficulties
in estimating inequality from the surveys, however, these results need to be taken with a grain of
salt.
Validation Using National-level Gini Coefficients Conventional Gini coefficients are typ-
ically computed at the national level and aim to measure inequality among a country’s citizens.
With a slight modification, we can use our procedure introduced above to produce national-level,
11This concern is less relevant to our analysis, since patronage would predominantly generate differences in nightlight
emission between groups, whereas we are interested in within-group variation.
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rather than group-level, estimates of inequality: Instead of computing the Gini coefficient across
all cells in a group region (step 4), we calculate the Gini across all cells in a country, and thus
obtain a spatial inequality indicator at the national level. This indicator can then be compared
to existing, survey-based indicators. For the validation exercise, we compute spatial inequality
estimates for 1992 and compare them to Gini values from the World Inequality Indicator Database
(WIID) (World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2008) for roughly the same time
period.12
The correlation between the raw values of the WIID estimates and our spatial ones is 0.51
(p = 0.00), which suggests that the latter pick up much of what the survey-based Gini coeffi-
cient measures. However, as we have argued above, one potentially huge source of error is that
the nightlights-based indicator cannot pick up the tremendous variation in income within urban
environments. For that reason, we test if and how excluding those regions affects the correlation
between our measure and the survey-based indicators. In order to do this, we first classify the
grid cells used for our inequality computation (see step 1 in the above procedure) according to
their level of urbanization. This is done using the GRUMP dataset (Center for International Earth
Science Information Network (CIESIN), 2011), which gives us the proportion of a cell’s area that
is ‘urban’. We then exclude cells based on different thresholds of this proportion from our analysis.
Results from this exercise confirm our expectation. Excluding cells that are 90% urban results in
an increase of the WIID-nightlights correlation to 0.57 and to 0.59 when excluding cells that are
80% urban (see Figure 1). In essence, implementing this simple adjustment of our nightlights-based
estimation procedure improves the correlation with conventional inequality indicators by 20%.
Validating GeoEPR Settlement Regions We have verified that the nightlights-based Gini
coefficient is able to pick up basic patterns of inequality across countries, but does it also identify
these patterns across groups? As argued above, one major source of error could result from the
fact that our spatial procedure assigns all individuals living in a group region to one group. Thus,
ethnically mixed populations cannot be identified correctly, which may constitute a major problem
for our estimation procedure. Luckily, there is a way to validate the GeoEPR coding of settlement
regions again using surveys as an alternative data source on ethnicity. The Demographic and Health
12Since the WIID has a considerable number of missing values for 1992 (our year of comparison), we include all



















































































































































Figure 1: Scatter plot of nightlights-based national-level Gini coefficients and those based on surveys
(WIID).
Surveys (DHS) are a collection of standardized surveys conducted for a large number of African
countries (United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2013). In addition to the
survey responses, more recent editions of the DHS also include the ethnicity of respondents and
their location in geographic coordinates. This information allows us to test whether a respondent’s
self-reported ethnicity matches his/her ethnicity as predicted by GeoEPR based on location.
Appendix Figure 1 illustrates the validation procedure for Sierra Leone graphically. The map
shows the large settlement regions of the country’s ethnic groups, as coded by the GeoEPR dataset.
The small dots represent the self-reported ethnicities of the DHS respondents. Since we only have
locations for clusters of respondents (and not separately for each respondent), we plot respondents
as circles around the cluster locations. Overall, the map shows that ethnicity based on the survey
predominantly matches the GeoEPR-coded ethnicity. However, it also shows that in densely pop-
ulated regions with high levels of diversity, the GeoEPR coding of ethnicity does not work as well
(see for example Freetown in the West of the country).
The sample for this validation exercise consists of 208,687 individual respondents from DHS
surveys between 1986 and 2011.13 We include all geocoded DHS surveys for Sub-Saharan Africa,
giving us data on over 17 different countries at various points in time.14 Data coverage is obviously
13This sample excludes respondents that do not report their group, those without geographic coordinates, and
those from groups coded as ‘dispersed’, i.e. without a clearly recognizable settlement region according to GeoEPR.
14The full list of used geocode DHS surveys is: Benin (1996, 2001), Cameroon (2004), Central African Republic
(1994), Ghana (1993, 1998, 2003, 2008,), Guinea (2005), Ivory Coast (1998), Kenya (2003, 2008), Liberia (1986, 2009,
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far from comprehensive, but we believe it represents a decent sample of Sub-Saharan African
countries. We manually match the group given in the DHS to the GeoEPR group categories
and then compute the GeoEPR group for each respondent. This is simply done by taking the
geographic location of a respondent (longitude/latitude coordinates) and looking up the GeoEPR
group polygon that exists for that location and the given year. The results from this exercise are
overwhelmingly positive. Out of the 208,687 individuals included in our sample, we can correctly
predict their ethnic group for more than two-thirds (142,871, 68.5%). Similar to the nightlights
measure, we may again be concerned that GeoEPR may be inaccurate in particular in urban areas
with high degrees of ethnic mixing. This expectation is confirmed: if we exclude respondents
living in ‘urban’ areas as measured by GRUMP, the percentage of respondents where GeoEPR
correctly predicts ethnicity goes up to 74.5% (102,789 correctly predicted respondents out of 138,038
respondents living in rural regions). This finding is another reason for excluding urban areas in our
main analysis below, as it is in these regions where the spatial measurement procedure seems to be
most prone to errors.
Group-level Comparison Using DHS Surveys Finally, we conduct a comparison at the
group level using again data from the DHS. Recent research has used this and other cross-national
surveys to measure group-level inequality indicators (Huber, Ogorzalek and Gore, 2011). However,
we note at the outset that the survey-based group-level inequality estimates are an imperfect data
source due to problems related to sampling, assignment of respondents to ethnic groups and the
computation of wealth/income (see discussion at the beginning of this section). Still, while we
cannot use the survey data as a reference measure to validate our data against, it is still interesting
to see whether survey- and nightlights-based estimates point in the same direction.
In comparison with other surveys such as Afrobarometer or the World Value Survey, DHS
seems to be quite well-suited for our task, since (i) the national sample sizes are large, leaving us
with large enough subsamples at the group level, and (ii) DHS employs a fine-grained measure of
wealth, which allows for a precise computation of a group-level Gini coefficient. We use again DHS
surveys for Sub-saharan Africa between 1986 and 2011. As described above, we match individuals
to EPR groups and compute the Gini coefficient across all individuals of a group. This is done by
2011), Malawi (2000, 2004, 2010), Mali (1996, 2006), Niger (1992, 1998), Nigeria (2008, 2010), Senegal (1993, 1997,
2005, 2008, 2010), Sierra Leon (2008), Togo (1988, 1998), Uganda (2011), and Zambia (2007).
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constructing a wealth index based on the series of household asset questions, including questions on
the type and quality of housing and the ownership of various household appliances and vehicles.15
After breaking the wealth index into quintiles, we calculated the Gini coefficient by numerical
approximation for each ethnic group using the trapezoid method. We drop again groups without
a territorial representation and those with small DHS sample sizes (30 and below). This leaves us
with a set of 251 groups for which we can compare survey- and nightlights-based Gini values.
For the groups in our sample, the correlation between the Gini based on DHS surveys and
the one based on nightlights is 0.42 (p=0.00). This is not very strong, but indicates that our
nightlights measure can pick up not only national-level, but even group-level inequality to a certain
extent. Again, we test whether the lack of precision of our spatial procedure in urban areas is
partly responsible for the result. This expectation is confirmed; excluding cells that are at least
80% urban (as explained above) improves the correlation by roughly 10% to 0.46. This correlation
may seem low at first, but we have to keep in mind that we are not comparing our nightlights-based
measure to the ‘true’ level of inequality.
In sum, our validation exercise has proven to be moderately successful. We have seen that
the nightlights-based inequality indicator is able to pick up much of what survey-based indicators
measure, both at the national and the group level. Also, we were able to confirm for Sub-Saharan
Africa that GeoEPR’s encoding of ethnic group regions allows us to predict the true ethnicity of
individuals to a very high extent. Of course, our spatial measurement technique is far from perfect.
Fore example, it is not applicable to groups without a territorial representation, and achieves weaker
results in urban areas. However, since it is largely free from reporting and selection biases that could
exist in surveys and is at the same time globally applicable, we believe that there are considerable
advantages to using it in a large-N analysis such as ours. In the next section, we introduce the
design of our analysis that relies on our new indicator.
15The following variables from the DHS surveys were used whenever available: existence and type of toilet facility
(v116), status of electrification (v119), ownership of a radio (v120), ownership of a television (v121), ownership
of a refrigerator (v122), ownership of a bicycle (v123), ownership of a motorcycle/scooter (v124), ownership of a
car/truck (v125), main floor material (v127), main wall material (v128), main roof material (v129), and ownership
of a telephone (v153).
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5 Research Design and Results
We are now ready to proceed to an empirical test of our theoretical propositions presented above.
Using regression analysis, we assess the explanatory impact of our nightlights-based inequality
indicator on ethnic conflict onset. Our approach relies on Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch
(2011) and amends their base model. The sample consists of politically marginalized ethnic groups,
which have limited inclusion in their country’s government, or are completely excluded from political
influence. The group list and the level of political participation is taken from the EPR dataset
(Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). Since our nightlights-based indicator only goes back as far
as 1992, we include annual observations from 1993 to 2010. This results in a sample of 7,286
group/years, which is slightly larger than the one in Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011,
6,438 observations) due to the longer time period (1993-2010 as compared to 1991-2005).
5.1 Variables
Our dependent variable is the onset of ethnic conflict and is taken from the ETH Zurich’s GROWup
data portal (http://growup.ethz.ch). The variable takes a value of ‘1’ in those years where an
ethnic groups becomes involved in armed conflict against the state. It is generated according to the
procedure presented in Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), where politically marginalized ethnic groups
are coded as “in conflict” if an armed organization fights on their behalf in a civil war as defined
by the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002).
The main independent variable is intra-group inequality based on nightlight emissions data for
1992, as introduced in the previous section. This is the earliest available release of these data, and
we use it to estimate a group’s risk of conflict in the years 1993 and onwards. Since our validation
has clearly demonstrated that urban areas introduce error into our inequality estimate, we exclude
these areas from the computation following the procedure described above. We use one estimate
of inequality, since inequality is a quantity that changes only slowly over the years.16 Thus, what
drives our results is the cross-sectional variation between groups, which we believe can be captured
sufficiently well using the nightlights-based indicator.
We include the same set of independent variables as Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011).
16The slow changes in inequality are confirmed by our nightlights indicator, where estimates for 1995 (2010) are
correlated with those for 1992 at 0.96 (0.84).
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First, we measure horizontal inequality as the relative economic status of a group as compared to
the country average (the lineq2 measure in the original paper). High values indicate that a group
is either rich or poor as compared to the country average. As Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch
(2011) have shown, high levels of horizontal inequality are related with a higher risk of conflict onset.
Next, in addition to these economic motives for conflict, we control for political motives using a
dummy for whether a group is excluded from political power, according to the EPR dataset. A
last group-level variable is the demographic power balance between the group and the group(s) in
power, which following Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011), is included both as a linear
term and in a squared transformation to account for non-linearities in its effect on conflict onset.
Last, we control for time trends by including the calendar year of observation and model temporal
dependence in our dependent variable by including the number of peace years as a control variable,
as well as its squared and cubed transformation (Carter and Signorino, 2010).
5.2 Results
We use logit models to test the impact of intra-group inequality on ethnic conflict. Our models
first replicate the base model from Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) and then add our
intra-group inequality variable (H1). Next, we test for conditional effects by interacting intra-group
inequality with our variables for economic motives—horizontal inequality—and political motives—
exclusion (H2). Table 1 shows the results of our analysis.
Model 1 replicates the results from Model 3 in Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011).
Since we rely on a different sample, the results differ to a certain extent. However, our analysis
confirms the main effects found in the original paper and show that horizontal inequality of a
group has a strong positive effect on conflict onset. Groups that are richer or poorer as compared
to the national average face a higher risk of large-scale political violence. This economic effect
operates together with a political one, as shown by the positive effect of the exclusion dummy:
lack of political participation is a strong predictor of conflict. The remaining control variables
receive largely the same effects as in the original model, but some fail to reach conventional levels
of significance.
Model 2 uses a fixed-effects logit model (conditional logit) with the specification from the pre-
vious model. A common concern with cross-national group-level analyses is that cross-national
24
Conflict Onset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Logit Cond. Logit Logit Cond. Logit Logit Logit Logit
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Intra-group inequality 2.077*** 1.50** 0.642 2.441*** 0.911
(0.522) (0.613) (1.482) (0.665) (1.480)
Horizontal inequality 0.446*** 0.370*** 0.487*** 0.407*** 0.504*** 0.770*** 0.816***
(0.131) (0.127) (0.153) (0.148) (0.151) (0.207) (0.213)
Excluded 1.266*** 1.854*** 1.334*** 1.730*** 0.064 1.287*** -0.112
(0.317) (0.601) (0.340) (0.590) (1.157) (0.321) (1.173)
IGI * Excluded 1.643 1.794
(1.585) (1.582)
IGI * Rel. Ineq. -0.414 -0.454
(0.290) (0.292)
Power balance 4.255 6.959** 4.726 7.200** 4.879 4.623 4.778
(3.021) (3.393) (3.043) (3.463) (3.051) (3.037) (3.042)
Power balance (sq.) -5.958 -9.830** -6.723 -10.262** -6.949 -6.638 -6.866
(4.204) (4.989) (4.348) (5.123) (4.368) (4.335) (4.345)
GDP per capita (log) -0.318** 0.042 -0.166 0.037 -0.179 -0.159 -0.172
(0.154) (1.236) (0.157) (1.242) (0.160) (0.165) (0.167)
No. excluded groups 0.010 -0.382 0.006 -0.374 0.006 0.005 0.006
(0.020) (0.233) (0.020) (0.235) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant 56.225 83.374 84.493 81.965 83.463
(60.573) (60.739) (60.547) (59.316) (59.121)
N 7279 2465 7279 2465 7279 7279 7279
Log-Likelihood -347.162 -239.470 -341.729 -238.078 -341.330 -341.312 -340.851
AUC 0.824 0.631 0.830 0.635 0.831 0.830 0.831
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Temporal controls (calendar year/peace years) not shown and standard errors clustered at the country-level.
Table 1: Regression results.
variation—rather than variation across groups—is driving the results. A conditional logit model
addresses these concerns by removing these purely cross-national differences, but in doing so, elim-
inates all the countries that do not have a conflict onset (thus the smaller N as compared to the
other models).
In Model 3, we add our intra-group inequality measure to the base model. As we hypothe-
sized above, intra-group inequality exhibits a positive and significant effect, indicating that ceteris
paribus, more unequal groups have a higher risk of engaging in violent political conflict. The size
of the effect is also significant in substantive terms; increasing intra-group inequality from 0.322
(5th percentile) to 0.984 (95th percentile) changes the predicted likelihood of conflict from 0.18
percent to 1.5 percent, an eight-fold increase. Note that the coefficient for horizontal inequality
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is virtually unaffected by the inclusion of intra-group inequality. This attests to our conjecture
that the different types of inequality are related to different types of conflict-inducing mechanisms;
while horizontal inequality fosters a group’s motivation for conflict, intra-group inequality has little
effect on motive but rather influences mobilization capabilities. Moreover, note that the inclusion
of intra-group inequality reduces the size of the GDP coefficient. This suggests that the latter may
be due to mobilization and not state strength, thus supporting the interpretation put forward by
Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) as opposed to the one by Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Model 4 uses again a conditional logit model with the same specification as Model 3. As the
table shows, our results hold, with intra-group inequality having a positive and strongly significant
effect.
In Models 5 through 7, we test the conditional effects of intra-group inequality. As argued above,
the effect of intra-group inequality should be stronger if both political and economic motives for
conflict are high. Model 5 tests the former by interacting the exclusion dummy with intra-group
inequality. As shown in Ai and Norton (2003), interpreting interaction effects in non-linear models
cannot be done based on the coefficients shown in the table. Thus, in Figure 2 we plot the average
simulated effect of intra-group inequality both for included and excluded groups. The plot confirms
our expectation. For politically included groups, intra-group inequality seems to have no effect.






















Average marginal effects of intra-group inequality
Figure 2: Average simulated effects of intra-group inequality on conflict onset, for included (left)
and excluded groups (right).
Model 6 interacts intra-group inequality with horizontal inequality compared to the national
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average. We plot the interaction effect in Figure 3. Horizontal inequality is represented along the
x-axis and ranges from 0 (no inequality) to 2 (groups that are either about 1/4 as wealthy as the
country average, or about four times as wealthy)17 Although less pronounced as in Model 5, we
find that the effect of intra-group inequality increases as economic motives for conflict increase;
over the range of horizontal inequality, there is a marginal increase in the predicted probability of
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Average marginal effects of intra-group inequality
Figure 3: Average simulated effects of intra-group inequality on conflict onset for different values
of horizontal inequality.
Model 7 adds both interactions at the same time. We visualize the interaction effect by sep-
arating out included groups (Figure 4, left panel) and excluded groups (Figure 4, right panel).
As we expected, for included groups and irrespective of their horizontal inequality status, there
is no effect of intra-group inequality, as the confidence interval in the left plot includes 0. This
is different, however, for included groups, where we see a positive effect of intra-group inequality
that increases as horizontal inequality goes up. Note that the political exclusion seems to have a
much stronger effect on the extent to which intra-group inequality affects conflict: While excluded
groups have a 3-4% increase in conflict risk due to intra-group inequality (compare left and right
panel), horizontal inequality increases the risk only by about 1% (right panel). In sum, these results
are evidence supporting our hypothesis above: Intra-group inequality seems to increase the risk of
conflict, but only if political and economic motives are present.
We also tested the impact of intra-group inequality on the predictive accuracy of the model
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Figure 4: Average simulated effects of intra-group inequality on conflict onset for different values
of horizontal inequality, for included (left) and excluded groups (right).
(Ward, Greenhill and Bakke, 2010). In models with a binary outcome variable, this is typically
done by ways of ROC analysis. Here, predictive accuracy is measured by the “area under the curve”,
an indicator ranging from 0.5 (no value added as compared to random prediction) to 1 (perfect
prediction). The AUC values for each of the models are given in the last row in Table 1. We can
see that the baseline model (Model 1) already has a relatively high AUC score. Adding intra-group
inequality (Model 3), the AUC score does increase, but only marginally so, demonstrating a weak
improvement over the base model. The AUC score for the conditional logit models (Model 2 and 4)
cannot be directly compared with the others, since they refer to the task of predicting conflict onset
for groups within countries where at least one conflict occurred (thus, there is no cross-national
variation that facilitates the prediction task).
5.3 Robustness Checks
Alternative operationalizations and specifications We amend the models presented above
with a series of additional checks, in order to ensure that the effect of intra-group inequality we
find above remains robust across different model specifications. Our robustness checks include the
baseline model testing the unconditional effect (Model 3) and the model with two interaction terms
(Model 7). Detailed results of this exercise can be found in the online appendix.
First, we run the models with regional dummies, taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The
effect of intra-group inequality remains positive and strongly significant in the unconditional model.
The interaction with economic motives shows again that for higher values of horizontal inequality,
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the effect of intra-group inequality increases for excluded groups, but there is almost no effect
for included groups. Second, we control for group wealth, taken from Cederman, Weidmann and
Gleditsch (2011). This test ensures that the effect of intra-group inequality we find is not due to
systematic differences in wealth across groups. Our results remain fully robust to controlling for
group wealth, and all our main effects of interest retain their signs and significance levels. In our
model, group wealth is not significantly related to conflict onset. Third, we control for the presence
of natural resources in the country, in particular oil. Oil production has been shown to affect
the risk of conflict, but may also contaminate our nightlights-based measure since it is associated
with particular night emissions (illumination of oil fields and exhaust flames). Our dummy for oil
production is based on Ross (2013). All our results remain robust to the inclusion of this variable.
Last, we test an alternative measure of state strength. As many other examples in the literature
(e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003), our model uses GDP per capita to capture state strength, which
may, however, capture many different factors. Therefore, we replace this variable with the incidence
of coup attempts in the two years prior to the year of observation, based on data from Powell and
Thyne (2011). The occurrence of coup attempts is an alternative indicator of a weak state and may
open a window of opportunity for rebellion. As we would expect, this indicator is positively related
to conflict risk, but remains insignificant and does not alter the effects of our main independent
variables.
Assessing Bias from Unobservables Despite our attempts to control for many potential con-
founders, we cannot rule out that unobservable factors are correlated both with our independent
and dependent variables, and lead us to mistakenly identify a significant association between intra-
group inequality and conflict initiation. In order to assess the likelihood that our observed effect is
solely due to selection bias, we follow a procedure proposed by Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005).18
The core idea is to assess how much stronger, in relation to observed controls, bias from unobserved
covariates would have to be to explain away the effect of our main independent variable, intra-group
inequality. This is done by comparing the coefficient estimated in a full model with all controls to
the one obtained in a restricted model with no (or few) controls. The result of this calculation is
a ratio, which indicates how much greater the effect of potential unobservables would need to be
18Their procedure was subsequently adapted for linear regressions by Bellows and Miguel (2009) and used in Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011). We compute this ratio based on linear probability models.
29
Controls in the Controls in the Intra-group IGI * IGI * horizontal
restricted set full set inequality (IGI) excluded inequality
Year and Peace Years Full set from Model 3 6.167
Year, Peace years, and
group-level controls Full set from Model 3 9.559
Year and Peace Years Full set from Model 7 -5.941 2.499
Year, Peace years, and
group-level controls Full set from Model 7 -9.696 6.069
Table 2: Using Selection on Observables to Assess the Bias from Unobservables Following Altonji,
Elder and Taber (2005).
relative to the included observables in order for the coefficient estimate to be zero. Positive values
indicate that adding controls attenuated the coefficient estimate of interest, while negative values
indicate that adding controls increased the coefficient estimate.
We consider two sets of restrictive covariates: one with only temporal controls (i.e., calendar
year and peace years) and another with temporal and group-level controls but no country-level
controls. Given our two hypotheses, we consider two different specifications from Table 1: the
unconditional Model 3 and the conditional Model 7. The analysis based on Model 7 include the
single and interaction terms in both the restricted and full set of convariates. The coefficient
estimates of interest are in Model 3 the estimate of intra-group inequality (IGI) and in Model 7
the coefficient estimates of the two interactions between intra-group inequality and political status
and horizontal inequality.
None of the six ratios presented in Table 2 are between −1 and 1. Their absolute values range
from 2.5 to 9.7, with a median ratio of 6.12. Therefore, to attribute the entire estimate to selection
effects, selection on unobservables would have to be at least 2.5 times greater than selection on
observables and, on average, over six times greater. In our view, this finding makes it less likely that
the estimated effect of intra-group inequality is fully due to unobservables. The different signs of
the ratios from Model 7 suggest that adding controls increases the effect of within-group inequality
among politically excluded groups on conflict initiation, while the same controls attenuate the
impact of interaction between the two different types of inequality. Moreover, the difference in
absolute values between the ratios of the two interactions, further strengthens our finding that
political exclusion is the more powerful motivator than horizontal economic inequality. Finally, the
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similar size of the ratios in absolute values between the unconditional Model 3 and the interaction
between within-group inequality and political exclusion in Model 7 strengthens our conclusion
that the observed unconditional effect is largely driven by the subset of politically excluded ethnic
groups.
6 Conclusion
Examining why some ethnic groups engage in violence is crucial to our understanding of civil war.
While a huge number of articles and books have been written on this question, much of this research
has focused either exclusively on opportunity (i.e., logistical and power-related arguments), or on
willingness (i.e., political and economic grievances), but rarely both. In this paper we argue that an
ethnic group must have both the opportunity and willingness to engage in conflict and that different
types of inequalities impact different aspects of that decision. Political and economic inequalities
between groups provide conflict motives, and intra-group economic inequality contributes to the
opportunity of a group’s elites to engage in a costly conflict by affecting the elites’ potential to
mobilize a sufficient number of fighters. In order to evaluate these claims empirically, we develop
a new spatial approach to measuring economic inequality using nightlight satellite imaginary, pop-
ulation rasters, and geocoded ethnic settlement areas. After validating our new measure, we add
our indicator to an existing statistical model of conflict onset and find considerable evidence in
support of our theoretical prediction. All else equal, greater economic inequality within a group
significantly increases its likelihood of initiating conflict, especially if the group has fewer political
or economic opportunities than others.
Although our results are far from definitive, leaving plenty of room for future theoretical and
empirical research, we believe they provide important insights for conflict research. First and
foremost, this paper makes a significant contribution to the ‘greed and grievance’ debate in the
civil war literature. By distinguishing between inter- and intra-group economic inequality, we show
that these different types of economic inequalities matter for conflict onset in distinct and previously
unnoticed ways. While inter-group inequality affects an ethnic group’s willingness to rebel, intra-
group inequality affects the group’s opportunity to launch a successful rebellion, suggesting that the
overall effect of economic inequality on conflict onset is more complex than previous studies claimed.
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The complex interaction of these different types of economic inequalities may be the reason why
previous quantitative studies failed to find a robust association between economic inequality and
conflict. Second, to our knowledge, this is the first global empirical study of the impact of within-
group economic inequality and its interaction with inter-group economic and political inequality
on conflict initiation at the group-level. Finally, our study offers one possible explanation for the
inconsistent effect of commodity price shocks on conflict onset (e.g., Bazzi and Blattman, 2011).
Many ethnic groups engage in specific economic activities based on different production structures
(e.g., large plantations versus small family farms). If a price shock affects a particular type of
production, it will have diverging effects across groups, depending on how it affects between- and
within-group inequalities among a country’s ethnic groups.
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A Supplementary Material for “Unequal We Fight: The Impact
of Economic Inequality Within Ethnic Groups on Conflict Ini-
tiation”
Validating GeoEPR group shape files with DHS survey data
The map below shows the ethnic group settlement regions of Sierra Leone according to the GeoEPR
dataset (green: Kono, yellow: Mende, blue: Limba, red: Temne). The small dots show the self-
reported ethnicity of DHS respondents. Since we only know the location of survey clusters, the
respondents of each cluster are arranged as circles around the cluster location. We can see that
to a large extent, the self-reported ethnicity of respondents corresponds to the ethnicity predicted
by the GeoEPR dataset. However, urban regions (see e.g. Freetown in the West of the country)
typically feature a very diverse population, which is difficult to measure using GeoEPRs regional
group representation.
Figure A.1: Validating GeoEPR group locations with DHS survey data.
Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects
Models A1 and A2 in Table A.1 control for regional fixed effects. Model A1 and A2 re-run Models





Intra-group inequality 2.428*** 1.711
(0.602) (1.550)




IGI * Excluded 1.740
(1.787)




* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard controls from Table 1 and temporal controls (calendar year/peace years) not shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.
Table A.1: Appendix: Controlling for Regional Fixed Effects
The figure below displays the simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A2.
Figure A.2: Average simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A2
Controlling for Group-Level Wealth
Models A3 and A4 in Table A.2 control for group wealth. Model A3 and A4 re-run Models 3 and





Intra-group inequality 2.143*** 0.911
(0.528) (1.496)




IGI * Excluded 1.801
(1.590)
IGI * Rel. Ineq. -0.400
(0.325)




* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard controls from Table 1 and temporal controls (calendar year/peace years) not shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.
Table A.2: Appendix: Controlling for group-level wealth
The figure below displays the simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A4.
Figure A.3: Average simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A4
Controlling for Oil Exporters
Models A5 and A6 in Table A.3 control for oil exporters based on Ross (2013). Model A5 and A6





Intra-group inequality 2.082*** 0.915
(0.520) (1.474)




IGI * Excluded 1.787
(1.569)
IGI * Rel. Ineq. -0.448
(0.293)




* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard controls from Table 1 and temporal controls (calendar year/peace years) not shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.
Table A.3: Appendix: Controlling for oil exporters
The figure below displays the simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A6.
Figure A.4: Average simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A6
Controlling for State Strength
Models A7 and A8 in Table A.4 control for state strength. Model A7 and A8 re-run Models 3 and





Intra-group inequality 2.528*** 1.770
(0.635) (1.543)




IGI * Excluded 1.466
(1.720)
IGI * Rel. Ineq. -0.537*
(0.323)
# of Coup Attempts in 0.187 0.157
previous 2 years (0.548) (0.552)
N 6770 6770
Log-Likelihood -328.674 -327.827
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard controls from Table 1 and temporal controls (calendar year/peace years) not shown.
Standard errors are clustered at the country-level.
Table A.4: Appendix: Controlling for state strength
The figure below displays the simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A8.
Figure A.5: Average simulated marginal effect plot based on Model A8
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